Returning to the publication.
100th Anniversary of the Shameful Lenin-Ataturk Pact
Martik Gasparyan: “EXTRAJUDICIAL EXPERT ANALYSIS of the Lenin–Atatürk Pact under International Law”
(The Moscow Treaty (Turkish: Moskova Anlaşması) — a Russian–Turkish treaty of “friendship and brotherhood” dated March 16, 1921)
Yesterday, the Russian foreign policy agency issued a statement declaring that it does not consider the denunciation of the Lenin–Atatürk Pact to be possible.
As justification for its position, it argues that in international practice, peace treaties establishing borders between states are not subject to denunciation.
Double standards: the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact can be denounced, but the Lenin–Atatürk Pact cannot. Kosovo and Crimea should be recognized, but Karabakh should not. As the great Frunzik Mkrtchyan once said: “…hey, hey!…” Not without reason did Charents note: “Armenian people! Your salvation lies in your unity.”
The most important point to understand is that, under international law, the Arbitral Award of the 28th President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, on the territorial delimitation between Armenia and Turkey does not have retroactive force. This is absurd. According to the position of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this would imply that the Bolsheviks violated international practice by breaching a peace treaty establishing borders between states — a treaty that should not have been subject to denunciation.
The statement of the Ministry is so unprofessional that it discredits and undermines the level of education and competence expected from high-ranking officials of a foreign policy institution. As was said in the film “Mimino”: “First think, then speak.” It seems that some MGIMO students live by the slogan “we didn’t study this…” or simply did not attend seminars. Why should mediocre students be paid by taxpayers and allowed to utter such “nonsense,” pardon the lack of political correctness? In democratic countries, officials resign in such cases, whereas in command-administrative systems they are, at best, sent on a “free trip” along Lenin’s historical route.
It turns out that the Bolsheviks had rights, but Armenians did not. In reality, as a great Armenian philosopher said: “Armenian sorrow is a bottomless sea…”
Double standards!
If this is still not enough to consider the Lenin–Atatürk Pact null and void, let us proceed further.
According to former U.S. Ambassador to Germany (1913–1917) James Gerard, the Bolsheviks concluded an agreement with Turkish Kemalists, under which they transferred to Turkey part of the territory of the Republic of Armenia annexed by the Bolsheviks (Artvin, Ardahan, the Kars region, Surmalu district). Two other parts of Armenian territory (Nakhichevan and Artsakh) were transferred to Azerbaijan, while the remaining territory of the Republic of Armenia was labeled “Soviet Armenia” and forcibly incorporated into Bolshevik Russia.
This, then, is the expert assessment of the Lenin–Atatürk Pact of 1921 according to international law.
In certain circles (Leninist–Stalinist historiography) and among some individuals (Bolshevik academic schools), there exists a mistaken belief that the Lenin–Atatürk Pact is followed by the Treaty of Kars of March 13, 1921, on the basis of which the Armenian–Turkish border is determined.
This is why the statement of the foreign policy agency notes:
“In this regard, from a legal standpoint, the termination of the treaty defining the state border line between Turkey and Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, as well as the status of certain territories of these states, contradicts these principles (i.e., the principles of international practice – editor’s note).”
It is necessary to clarify this issue definitively.
The only legal document under international law on the basis of which the Armenian–Turkish border is determined is the Arbitral Award of the 28th President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, on the territorial delimitation between Armenia and Turkey, issued on November 22, 1920.
The recognition by the international community of the political responsibility of the Ottoman Empire was expressed mainly in two interconnected forms:
- the separation of Armenia from Turkey as a national state;
- the territorial delimitation between the Turkish and Armenian states.
Justifying the need for political sanctions for the Armenian Genocide, the Deputy High Commissioner of Great Britain in Constantinople, Webb, wrote in a telegram sent on April 3, 1919, to the Paris Peace Conference:
“To punish all those responsible for atrocities against the Armenians would require executing virtually all Turks; therefore, I propose that punishment should instead take the form of partition along national lines of the former Turkish Empire, and individually – trials of high-ranking officials whose fate will serve as an example to others.”
This position was held by all the great powers participating in the Paris Peace Conference, including the United States, which had not been at war with Turkey.
In a memorandum from U.S. President Woodrow Wilson to the Ottoman government, delivered on August 22, 1919, by U.S. High Commissioner in Constantinople Admiral Bristol, the direct connection between the issue of Armenia’s separation and the policy of genocide was emphasized.
The issue of the political and legal grounds for terminating Turkish sovereignty over Armenia was specifically studied by the King–Crane Commission appointed by President Wilson.
In its report presented on August 28, 1919, the American position was expressed with full clarity:
“The grounds for the separation of Armenia include the demonstrated inability of the Turks to govern other peoples… the adoption of repeated massacres as deliberate state policy; the near total absence of remorse or intent to condemn these crimes – rather attempts to justify them; virtually nothing has been done by the Turks to repatriate Armenians or compensate them… continued hostility and constant threat of massacre; strong evidence that the two races cannot live together peacefully… therefore it is better for both to have separate states… the most basic justice demands at least the creation of a territory where Armenians can live free from Turkish rule… nothing else can provide adequate guarantees of safety… nor satisfy the conscience of the world… In the interest of Armenians, Turks, and world peace, it is necessary to insist on the creation of a separate Armenian state.”
The obligation of the Allied Entente powers to recognize an Armenian state uniting both parts of Armenia — Turkish and Russian — is also confirmed in a special memorandum on Transcaucasia prepared by the British Foreign Office on December 24, 1919:
“It must be immediately recognized that in this respect Armenia is in a different position than Georgia and Azerbaijan. For all the Allied powers, during the war, more or less directly committed themselves to the creation of an independent Armenian State under a European or American mandate. The only question remaining to be resolved in the case of Armenia is the extent of Turkish territory that should be added to the Erivan Republic in order to create the new state.”
A significant role in establishing the political responsibility of the Turkish state under international law was played by the collective position of the Principal Allied Powers, acting as an international authority responsible for shaping the postwar order.
In the decisions of the Paris Peace Conference, individual motivations were largely subordinated to the imperatives of international law and international morality.
Archival documents allow us to trace the process of establishing the political responsibility of the Turkish state for the Armenian Genocide under international law. On this issue, the positions of the Principal Allied Powers and other states demonstrated an exceptional level of unanimity, unprecedented given the global contradictions of the time.
Having qualified the actions of the Turkish government as the “murder of an entire people,” and therefore as a crime against humanity, the international community at the Paris Peace Conference established the political responsibility of the genocidal Turkish state and, due to its “inability to govern other peoples,” decided to terminate its sovereignty over territories inhabited by non-Turkish populations.
According to many authoritative historians, Britain and France transferred the Armenian question to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, understanding that Congress might not give a favorable response, after which the Armenian side would become more compliant.
However, the Europeans underestimated the influence of the Armenian lobby in Congress.
On January 8, 1920, the House of Representatives, and three days later the Senate, approved a resolution sponsored by Congressman James Clark, granting President Woodrow Wilson the authority to issue an arbitral decision on the Armenian–Turkish border.
Overall, the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied Powers in Paris agreed to recognize the legitimacy of the Armenian government, provided that the issue of borders with Turkey was resolved.
The full report of the Commission on the Arbitration of the Border between Turkey and Armenia was submitted to the U.S. State Department on September 28, 1920. The report defined:
– the zone subject to arbitration, sources available to the Commission, and the principles guiding its work;
– the necessity of including Trebizond as a guarantee of Armenia’s access to the sea;
– the advisability of demilitarizing the border line and the characteristics of the emerging Armenian state;
– Armenia’s immediate financial prospects and the current political situation in the Middle East.
The territory allocated to Armenia by the Arbitral Award of President Woodrow Wilson amounted to 103,599 square kilometers.
The arbitration also clarified that the reduction of Armenia’s territory was due to the drastic decrease of the indigenous Armenian population as a result of Turkish policies of extermination.
The provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres concerning Armenians were adopted after careful consideration of the fact that Turkish Armenia had been deprived of its Armenian population.
Thus, the Arbitral Award of November 22, 1920, determined the border between Armenia and Turkey, which was delimited in strict accordance with Article 81 of the Hague Convention of 1907:
“An award, duly pronounced and notified to the agents of the parties, settles the dispute definitively and without appeal.”
Moreover, the work of the League of Nations began with the Armenian question and the delineation of Armenia’s borders.
At the fifth plenary session of the first Assembly of the League of Nations in Geneva on November 17, 1920, Lord Robert Cecil stated:
“I wish to speak on a matter that is very close to the heart of a very influential section of public opinion in all countries. I refer to the Armenian question…”
Also noteworthy is the letter of British Prime Minister David Lloyd George to the President of the Council of the League of Nations, Paul Hymans, dated November 10, 1920:
“…As for the future, I have the honor to remind you that, in accordance with the Treaty of Sèvres, President Wilson was asked to act as arbitrator regarding the boundaries between Armenia and Turkey. Until he announces his decision, no useful result can be expected from any discussion concerning measures to enforce the treaty.”
Today, however, in response to every momentary socio-political situation, the same so-called “expert clowns” appear on television shows, radio programs, and other media outlets, who, since the signing of the Lenin–Atatürk Pact, have been publishing books. Yet, strangely enough, no one has undertaken an expert legal analysis of the Lenin–Atatürk Pact under international law in order to determine its validity or invalidity.
According to the official United Nations treaty handbook, international treaties are agreements between subjects of international law through which they create, modify, or terminate mutual rights and obligations.
This is also enshrined in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 2(1)(a) defines a treaty as “an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law.” Thus, the decisive factor for the legality of a treaty is its compliance with international law.
Accordingly, each party concluding a treaty must be a duly authorized representative of a legally recognized government of a state that is a subject of international law. As stated in the preamble of the Lenin–Atatürk Pact, it was concluded between the government of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.
Since the legal status of any treaty derives from the status of its signatories, it is necessary first to clarify the status of each party to the Lenin–Atatürk Pact as of March 16, 1921.
- Status of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) in 1921
At the time of signing the Lenin–Atatürk Pact, the RSFSR was not recognized and therefore was not a subject of international law. Consequently, the Bolshevik government had no legal capacity to conclude an international treaty.
“Recognitions” that took place prior to 1924 did not produce legal consequences, as they were issued by non-recognized states or regimes. For recognition to be legally valid, it must be granted by a duly recognized subject of international law.
For example, in 1920 the Soviet government recognized the Baltic states, but this recognition was not accepted by the Allied powers, since the Soviet government itself was not legally recognized.
This approach was also reflected in judicial decisions. In the case “RSFSR vs. Cibrario” (1923), a U.S. court refused to accept a claim from the Soviet government on the grounds that it was not recognized. A similar ruling was issued by the Supreme Court of Sweden in “Soviet Government vs. Ericsson” (1921).
These and numerous other judicial decisions confirm the principle of international law that governments without recognition do not legally exist and therefore cannot perform legal acts such as concluding treaties, granting citizenship, or participating in legal proceedings.
- Status of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in 1921
The same reasoning applies to the so-called “government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey,” on behalf of which the Turkish side signed the Pact.
Even the Kemalists themselves did not claim to represent Turkey in the presence of a lawful authority. They acted not on behalf of the Turkish state, but as a structure resembling a political organization composed of former deputies, officers, and officials.
Until November 1922, when Sultan Mehmed VI left Turkey, only the Ottoman Sultan possessed the legal authority under the Ottoman Constitution to conduct foreign relations.
Furthermore, the Kemalist movement itself began in violation of the Ottoman Constitution and international law, as it constituted a rebellion against the legitimate authority of the Sultan-Caliph and violated the Armistice of Mudros (October 30, 1918).
In 1921, Mustafa Kemal was still considered a fugitive criminal. He had been sentenced to death by religious decree in April 1920, and the sentence was confirmed by a military tribunal and approved by the Sultan. The criminal prosecution was only lifted in 1923.
In addition, under international law, treaties cannot impose obligations or rights on third parties without their consent. This principle is codified in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: “A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.”
Conclusion
Therefore, the Lenin–Atatürk Pact is:
- a) illegal and invalid;
- b) incapable of creating any obligations for the Republic of Armenia;
c) incapable of determining the Armenian–Turkish border or transferring territories such as Nakhichevan to Azerbaijan.
The Pact contradicts peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens). As stated in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, any treaty that conflicts with such norms at the time of its conclusion is void.
It is noteworthy that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself has stated that the provisions of the Lenin–Atatürk Pact cannot be applied in current relations between Russia and Turkey due to significant geopolitical changes after 1921.
Martik GASPARYAN,
Forensic Expert; Member of the Scientific Council of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS); Member of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences (RANS); Chairman of the Armenian Branch of RANS (ARMAEN); Member of the Eurasian Scientific-Expert Council on Science and High Technologies; Vice-President of the International Academy of Spiritual Unity of the Peoples of the World (MADENM); Deputy of the National Assembly (Parliament) of Western Armenia.
March 16, 2020
Note
[1] http://nt.am/am/news/17425/#sthash.adTuPiRf.dpuf
[2]https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9C%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9_%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%80_(1921)
[3] http://www.lragir.am/index/rus/0/politics/view/47453#sthash.BhZMEOKS.dpuf
[4]http://cyclowiki.org/wiki/%D0%9F%D0%B0%D0%BA%D1%82_%D0%9C%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0-%D0%A0%D0%B8%D0%B1%D0%B1%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%BF%D0%B0
[5] Report [Pursuant to H. Res. 346 & H. Res. 438]. Communist Takeover & Occupation of Armenia
[6]https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9A%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%81%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9_%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%80
[7] http://www.lragir.am/index/rus/0/politics/view/47453#sthash.BhZMEOKS.dpuf
[8]https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%92%D0%B8%D0%BB%D1%8C%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%BD,_%D0%92%D1%83%D0%B4%D1%80%D0%BE
[9] Dadrian V. N. The History of the Armenian Genocide. Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus. Providence-Oxford: Berghahm Books, 1995, p. 306//Britsh Foreign Office Archives 371/4173/53351 (folio 192-193)
[10] Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1919. The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. VII, p. 858.
[11] Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. XII, p. 811-914.
[12] Опубликована только часть текста меморандума: Documents on British Foreign Policy. 1919-1939. First Series. Vol. III. 1919 (London, 1949). Doc. N613. Note 1, p. 700-702.
[13] Moore J. B. Digest of International Law. Washington, 1906, v. I, p. 73
[14] Имевшие место до 1 февраля 1924 г. так называемые признания не создают каких-либо юридических последствий, поскольку они исходили от непризнанных стран или властей: Эстония 02.02.1920; Литва 30.06.1920; Латвия 11.08.1920; Польша 12.10.1920; Финляндия 14.10.1920; Иран 26.02.1921; Афганистан 28.02. 1921; Турция 16.03.1921; Монголия 05.11.1921 (Schuman F. L. American Policy toward Russia since 1917: A Study of Diplomatic History, International Law and Public Opinion. London, 1928, p. 351).
[15] Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920. Washington, 1936, v. III, p. 462
[16] Hudson M. O. Annual Digest of Public International Law. Cambridge, 1931-1932, сase №28
[17] Ibid, сase №30
[18] Chen T.-C. The International Law of Recognition. London, 1951, p. 138
[19] ] O’Connell D. P. State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law. Cambridge, 1967, v. I, p. 211
[20] Amnesty Declaration and Protocol, signed 24 July 1923
[21] Jankovic B. M. Public International law. NY, 1984, p. 302
[22] http://www.lragir.am/index/rus/0/politics/view/47453#sthash.BhZMEOKS.dpuf
